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BAR BRIEFS
utilities any property which is not theirs according to accepted constitu-
tional notions. Though such property is devoted to a public use, still
the current legal theory recognizes that it is subject to non-public owner-
ship and management and the owners of it would seem to be entitled to
the increased value as are the owners of other property. It is
the present value of the property, the property.as it is presently, and a
reasonable return thereon to which the owner seems to be entitled and
in which he is protected by the guaranties of the 14th Amendment.
(37 Harv. L. Rev. 173; 9 A. B. A. J. 534.)
A different view would seem to require a distinct change in con-
stitutional theory, or a drastic denial of traditionally recognized incidents
of ownership notwithstanding the Constitution.
Ed :-It is to be noted here that the U. S. Supreme Court has handed
down another decision, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 123, since the editor of the Iowa
Law Review wrote the foregoing. The Court again divided, Justices
Brandeis, Holmes and Stone dissenting.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-CAUSAL RELATION-CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
The rather recent case of Mahoney vs. Beatman, 147 Atl. 762, is
worth the reading, if for no other reason than because of the fact that
the writer of the opinion, Chief Justice Wheeler of Connecticut, is mak-
ing a considerable contribution to the restatement of tort law by the
American Law Institute.
The facts in the case were: Defendant, while proceeding northerly,
drove his car across the center of the road and onto the left hand side,
so that plaintiff, who was driving rapidly in the opposite direction, was
forced off the concrete onto the shoulder of the road. Despite this
giving of ground, the defendant's car struck the hub of the left front
wheel of plaintiff's car. Plaintiff's chauffeur lost control of the car,
and it swerved and crashed into a tree and a stone fence. The findings-
defendant's car was on wrong side of road; speed of plaintiff's car
was unreasonable but did not contribute to collision, which was due
entirely to defendant's negligence; the speed did, however, materially
hamper plaintiff in controlling car after collision; actual repair bill was
nearly $6,000; since court was unable to find from evidence the amount
of damage caused at time of impact, plaintiff is entitled to "nominal
damages," assessed at $200.
HELD: (on appeal) Excessive speed and loss of control did not
defeat plaintiff, because defendant's violation of duty (driving on
wrong side of road) was a substantial factor in the total result.
Editorial discussion of this decision in the February Yale Law
Journal is very interesting and instructive. We quote: "Under the
theory of the trial court the plaintiff would have contributed to the
full loss, hence he should recover only for the damage done by the first
impact. Under the appellate court's theory, either the judge (or the
jury) could have found substantial causal relation between the total
loss and the original impact. Under the dissenting opinion the case
could have gone back to the trial court for determination of the relation
between the plaintiff's negligence and the total loss. Under the analysis
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here suggested the court could say with good reason that the scope of
the plaintiff's duty comprehended just such a risk as that of another
traveler crowding the center of the road at the moment of passing, and
that the duty of reasonable speed was to eliminate just such risks from
highway travel... The factor of capacity to pay plays a large part...
The. risks of traffic harms are so great under the best conditions and
so easily shifted by insurance, that the courts reflect the general feeling
that the operator of one vehicle who by its mismanagement interferes
with that of another ought to bear the risk despite the fact that the
person hurt may also be an offender in some other particular. The
tendency toward insurance for all traffic harms without reference to
fault is reflected more and more in traffic decisions. Since such harms
are inevitable and cannot be apportioned with precision on any basis
of fault, both good administration and good economics would require
that they be adjusted on some more practical basis. . . The acceptance
of such a viewpoint takes much of the load off legal theory and permits
a tolerance towards the articulation of judgment which is not greatly
disturbed by the fear that the integrity of any particular brand of legal
theory is thereby threatened."
CITIZEN AND JUDICIARY
In the February issue of the Los Angeles Bar Association Bulletin
Judge Yankwich has a well-written article on the above subject, from
which we clip a few short paragraphs:
"Ultimately our liberties are wrapped up in the persons of those
who come in conflict with the law. If these rights are denied them,
they cease to exist for us all. And if the judge does not protect the
accused in these rights-and secure them for him-no one will.
"Prosecutors are interested chiefly in records of conviction. Few
(the exceptional ones only) are interested in the manner in which con-
victions are secured. It is the province of the trial judge to supervise
the manner of conviction. For the prosecutor's trampling on the rights
of the accused-for his misconduct-the judge is held responsible. If
there is a reversal for such misconduct, it is the judge's judgment, follow-
ing the verdict, which is sacrificed on the alter of the prosecutor's vanity
or incompetence. And the commonwealth is the sufferer. The judge,
by living up to his true function, by upholding the rule of law, helps
the commonwealth."
Quoting Judge Benjamin Cardozo (The Nature of the Judicial
Process, page-i4o) the article says: "The judge is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his
own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from
consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to
vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion,
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system,
and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life.
Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains ;"
and this is followed by the statement of Zechariah Chaffee Jr., (The
Inquiring Mind, page 265) which reads: "The problem of the judiciary
is, therefore, not the selection and easy removal of judges on a political
